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Abstract
Internet is increasingly used for card not present e-commerce archi-
tectures. Several protocols, such as 3D-Secure, have been proposed in
the literature by Card schemes or academics. Even if some of them are
deployed in real life, these solutions are not perfect considering data se-
curity and user’s privacy. In this paper, we present a comparative study
of existing solutions for card not present e-commerce solutions. We con-
sider the main security and privacy trends of e-payment in order to make
an objective comparison of existing solutions. This comparative study
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illustrates the need to consider privacy in deployed e-commerce architec-
tures. This has never been more urgent with the recent release of the new
specifications of 3D-secure.
1 Introduction
E-commerce has developed significantly in recent years, with 1.4 billion of online
shoppers are counted in the World in 2016 [1] for a total amount of transac-
tions near 2.7 billions dollars. In 2016, the fraud amount in electronic payments
increases with the same regularity. Today, it becomes an important preoccupa-
tion for both financial institutions and users, and a problem of trust between
the different actors [25]. Despite the fact that personal data is exchanged with
e-commerce websites during an online payment, the banking industry mainly fo-
cuses on identity spoofing and user authentication. The electronic transaction
security should not be strengthened at the expense of privacy protection, and
a consumer centric privacy system should ensure data privacy with a possible
control by users over their personal information [36].
Four actors are necessarily involved in electronic payments during a Card-
Not-Present transaction. The client (also called the cardholder) browses on
the website of the merchant, called service provider (or SP ), to buy an online
service. These two actors have a payment provider, respectively called the issuer
bank and the acquirer bank. Nevertheless, in most online payment schemes,
other actors are involved. They are generally employed as trusted third party,
with various roles. For example, it can be an interoperability system, such
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as in 3D-Secure, or an identity provider operated by the banks themselves,
such as the BankID system [20]. In addition, an authentication system for
payment providers is required for fraud resistance but is generally not described
in these protocols. Finally, alternative payment systems such as the three-party
model PayPal are out-of-scope of this paper. Indeed, we focus in this paper
on e-commerce architectures involving banks (representing a large proportion
of e-payments).
During an online purchase (card not present transaction), the client sends
various banking information such as the PAN (Primary Account Number), the
expiry date of the card and the secure cryptogram CV X2 (Card Verification
Value/Code). This online service generally uses a secure connection between
the client and the SP website, using a protocol such as SSL/TLS, ensuring
the confidentiality and the integrity of the transaction on the Internet. But,
in the same time, neither the client’s authentication, nor the confidentiality of
the data, on the merchant and bank parts, is granted. In basic systems, the
client authentication is realized with the knowledge of these banking information
(particularly the CVX2), whereas with advanced systems, such as 3D-secure, the
authentication is strengthened by an additional data (in complement to banking
information), as described below. This additional data is generally an OTP sent
by SMS on the mobile device of the user, even if the NIST has recently warned
against this system for payments [29].
Historically, many architectures have been defined for client authentication
during a Card-Not-Present transaction such as SET (Secure Electronic Trans-
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actions [35]). SET is quickly replaced by 3D-secure, that is widely used for
many transactions [37]. In addition, alternative protocols have been proposed
in the academic literature [4, 10, 3], in order to strengthen the lack of privacy
in 3D-secure. Nevertheless, there is no real comparison between these proto-
cols in term of architecture, security and privacy objectives. Finally, two new
specifications have been recently published, with a tokenization approach [19]
and a new version of 3D-secure (v 2.0) [17, 15, 16, 18]. These specification are
described with a special target on mobile devices, providing a new architecture
for these electronic payments, where user’s privacy has been totally abandoned
in favor to fraud detection by the banks. Another EMV-compliant payment
system using tokenization, where the security is based on the secure element of
a mobile has also been recently proposed in [11].
The objective of this paper is to make a comparative study of existing ar-
chitectures for e-commerce. As many main papers in the literature [28, 12, 23],
we focus on security trends an architecture must fulfill within this context. We
also consider privacy trends to analyze the benefit of the architecture proposed
in the state of the art, we think this issue is becoming more and more impor-
tant nowadays as big data is operational in many applications. The machine
learning capabilities are able, for example, to identify an individual by analyzing
its e-commerce behavior. Finally, we also propose a comparative study on the
new specification of 3D-secure with a particular attention on electronic payment
with mobile platforms.
Section 2 presents the context of online payments and defines the require-
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ments for user’s privacy and data security. Existing card payment architectures
in the literature are detailed in Section 3. Section 4 presents a comparative
study of architectures in the state of the art by considering security and privacy
trends. Finally, conclusions and perspectives are given in Section 5.
2 Security and privacy protection requirements
This section establishes a set of security and privacy requirements for an au-
thentication protocol for online payments (with a usability requirement), com-
plementing previous works presented in [13, 3, 34]. Personal data involved in
online payments should be divided in several parts (three parts in the present
paper), because these data are shared between several entities, that have no
operational requirements for access to all these data (except maybe for fraud
detection):
1. The identity information are the data linked to the client’s identity, such
as a name, a home phone (or mobile) number, an email address, a billing
address or a special ID number.
2. The purchase information are the data linked to the expected service, as
the SP name, purchase details, purchase currency, purchase date and time.
3. The banking information include the issuer bank name, the personal ac-
count number (PAN), the card expiry date and the cryptogram CVX2.
Additional information on the client’s browser can also be captured at each
transaction (typically to determine the ability to support authentication in 3D-
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secure) as the IP address, the browser language and time zone, browser screen
information or also geolocalization data (particularly in the case of a mobile
device).
Figure 1: Actors involved in e-commerce architectures.
Four actors are present in electronic payments: The client wants to pur-
chase an online service with a payment card, through the website of a service
provider SP. These two actors have each one payment provider: the issuer and
the acquirer bank. In most of e-payment architectures, a fifth actor is involved,
the trusted party as a third-party cashier or the Directory used in 3D-Secure.
The role of this fifth actor is consequently, various and strongly depends of the
architecture.
Independently to the transaction, the issuer bank knows identity information
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of the client (maybe not all this information) and their related banking informa-
tion. During the transaction, the merchant knows all purchase information, but
does not necessary knows the identity of the client who realize this transaction
(and particularly his/her banking information). More generally, it is suitable
that in the case of an architecture with a fifth actor, this actor does not acquire
more information than necessary (and ideally no personal information, as in a
honest-but-curious model).
A list of security and privacy requirements, including risks raised in the
literature [23, 8], is established. It also includes a necessary requirement on
deployability of the architecture (for example describing if the system is realistic
or user-friendly). These requirements have been determined after a security and
privacy audits on authentication protocols on common e-payment architectures,
as those described in the next section:
• S1: The confidentiality of transactions requires that each exchanged
data must be encrypted against external entities.
• S2: The integrity of transmitted information ensures that the content
of messages have not been altered.
• S3: The SP authentication by the client or by a trusted party ensures
the identity of the SP.
• S4: The banks authentication by a trusted party ensures the identity
of acquirer and the issuer bank.
• S5: The client’s authentication by a trusted party ensures the identity
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of the client. Depending on the situation, the trusted party can ideally be
the issuer bank or another trusted party where the client is registered.
• P1: The confidentiality of client’s identity towards the SP ensures
that a client can access to a service without disclosing his/her identity to
the SP (it is waived if the customer wants a home delivery service).
• P2: The confidentiality of client’s identity towards the acquirer
bank ensures that the SP can deliver a service to the client without dis-
closing his/her identity to the acquirer bank.
• P3: The confidentiality of purchase information ensures that only
authorized persons have access to order information. This requirement
includes that the client’s purchase is unknown to the issuer bank.
• P4: The confidentiality of banking information ensures that only
authorized persons have access to banking data. This requirement includes
the fact that the SP does not know the client’s banking information.
• P5: The confidentiality of acquirer bank includes the fact that the
client does not know the acquirer bank.
• U1: The deployability ensures the credibility of use of the proposed
e-commerce architectures, particularly for fraud detection aspect that
should decrease the deployability of privacy compliant architectures.
Remark: the requirement P5 could be important, in term of privacy, in the
case of small service provider, for example reduced to only one person.
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3 Comparative study
In this section, we review the most important authentication protocols in non
card present e-commerce architectures involving banks (with a particular atten-
tion on authentication flow). We do not review the authentication solution of
the client, but the connection of this authentication with the different domains
(issuer, acquirer, ..) involved in the architecture. We have chosen past and
present solutions used in the industry and academic ones. For example, the
SET protocol was marginally used (but widely studied in academic literature),
whereas the 3D-secure deployment for merchants is currently widely deployed
(for example in 2014, the deployment rate was in 57% in Germany and was 47%
in Great Britain [30]).
3.1 The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol
Several companies, including VISA and MasterCard, developed the SET proto-
col, [35], for secure electronic payment transactions by credit card. Surprisingly,
the SET protocol ensured some SP and client’s privacy protection, while its suc-
cessor (3D-secure) was specified without notion of privacy.
This protocol is partially described in Figure 2 and has been analyzed in
detail in the early 2000s, with some improvements. The most important point
is the authentication of the client is realized with a certificate, verified by the
service provider, allowing client’s information to be partially partitioned before
the authorization step (i.e. the issuer bank is only requested for authorization).
We refer the reader to the abundant literature for more details on the SET
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Figure 2: The SET protocol (adapted from [31])
protocol [26, 7, 5, 6, 9, 21].
3.2 The 3D-Secure protocol (3DS)
The 3D-Secure protocol is an authentication protocol developed by Visa in 2001
[37] for electronic transactions. Other financial institutions had also developed
their own implementations, such as MasterCard with MasterCard SecureCode
and American Express with SafeKey (a comparison between them is given in
[32]). Security limitations of 3D-secure are underlined in [32, 27, 14]), particu-
larly on the client authentication solution (realized by the issuer bank, generally
through a pop-up window on the client’s browser).
This protocol is commonly used for electronic payments over the Internet,
through nine steps exchanged among five actors in the system (or three domains
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Figure 3: The 3D-Secure protocol [37]
: the issuer, the acquirer and the interoperability domains). As shown in Figure
3, the fifth actor is the Visa server, called Directory, used as a gateway between
the issuer and the acquirer bank. A dedicated module called MPI (Merchant
Plug In) must be imported to the site of SP.
3D secure protocol has for objective to transfer the transaction responsibility
(i.e. client authentication) from the merchant to the issuer bank. The client’s
authentication is realized for this reason by the issuer bank. The main security
flaw of 3D-Secure implementations (weak client’s authentication), as underlined
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in [27], has been corrected by many banks. The client’s authentication with
his/her date of birth date or other trivial secrets is generally replaced by an
OTP (One Time Password) sent to user’s mobile phone. Nevertheless, the
NIST has recently deprecated this type of two-factors authentication with SMS
(called out-of-band) [29].
3D-secure only describes the authentication protocol in online payments:
the complete payment phase is not described with an authorization request
for settlement. Thus, the entire transaction system using 3D-Secure protocol
contains more than nine steps:
A The client sends his/her purchase intention to the service provider, accom-
panied by banking information required for the payment.
B The service provider contacts the Directory server for client’s authentication
(VEReq message).
C The Directory checks the service provider identity and recover the issuer
bank (the ACS for Access Control Server) from the client’s PAN.
D The ACS verifies the client’s card and sends a cardholder authentication
URL to the service provider (VERes message).
E The service provider requests the cardholder authentication, accompanied by
the details of the authorized purchase, from the ACS,
F The issuer bank authenticates the client.
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Figure 4: The Ashrafi et Ng’s protocol [4]
G The ACS sends a confirmation of the client’s authentication to the service
provider (PARes message).
H The service provider records this PARes message.
I The service provider is authenticated by the acquirer bank. The bank checks
the transaction and realizes a transaction authorization with the issuer
bank (not described in the 3D-secure specifications).
3.3 The Ashrafi and Ng’s protocol (AN)
Ashrafi and Ng in [4] proposed a payment scheme, ensuring a good level of
privacy for the client. This protocol uses an optional third party payment
gateway (not developed in this paper), and takes place as shown in Figure 4:
A The client requests the SP’s public key and the credit card issuer’s public
key,
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B The SP sends the SP’s certificate and the credit cards company’s certificate
(with a transaction login), to the client,
C These two certificates are checked and the client generates two packages:
• Payment information: the hash of the card details, of the password and
of the order information, the timestamps and validity period. This pack-
age is encrypted with the public key of the card company.
• Purchase information: the transaction identifier, the transaction amount,
the timestamp and the validity period. This package is encrypted with
the SP’s public key.
D The two packages sent to the SP.
E The SP decrypts the second package with its private key. If the verification
is correct, the SP generates a unique payment identifier.
F The two packages are sent to the cards company.
G The card issuer decrypts the payment information with its private key. The
company checks the time stamp and expiration date. The hash of the
customer data is also checked thanks to the hash locally stored by the
company.
H The card issuer sends the message to the issuer bank for checking the client’s
balance.
I The issuer bank checks the client’s balance.
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J The issuer bank accepts or rejects the transaction and informs the card com-
pany. This latter sends the response to the SP.
At high level, the design of this protocol splits personal information in two
types (payment information (BI in Figure 4) and purchase information (OI in
Figure 4)) and encrypts them with two different keys, one for each actor. The
main drawback of this scheme is that all payment information, used to identify
the client and the issuer bank, are known by the card company (the issuer bank
is only requested for authorization). That implies a centralized database of
information, at the scale of the card company and not only at the scale of the
issuer bank.
3.4 Improved 3D-Secure (3DS Imp)
The 3D secure protocol could be improved as presented in [34] for more privacy
protection. The first observation involves banking information (CVX2 and the
expiration date), that are not necessary information to the service provider.
Secondly, one acquirer bank’s certificate (with standard information, as well as
the Directory public key) could be used for authentication. This protocol only
modifies the two following steps:
A The acquirer bank’s certificate is sent to the client by the service provider.
The client encrypts banking information with the Directory public key
and sends these encrypted data to the service provider.
C The Directory server decrypts these information with its private key and
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checks SP’s identity, the card number and the issuer bank. The Directory
recovers the ACS and transfers the VEReq message.
The public key of the Directory server, easily available to the service provider,
can be used to protect banking information of the merchant part. Clearly the
service provider does not need these information to be paid for the purchases.
Nevertheless, these simple privacy improvements have never been considered
and deployed in real-world electronic payment architectures.
3.5 Improved Ashrafi and Ng’s protocol (AN Imp)
One modification in the Ashrafi and Ng protocol allows to avoid the storage of
all client’s bank information at the card company level. This improved version
is presented in [33], where the card company acts as a relay and does not make
more numerous audits of client’s data. The verification are delegated to the
issuer bank that already has knowledge of banking information. Only three
steps are then required to be changed (the other steps being the same as above):
C The client generates two packages. The purchase information is encrypted
with the SP public key, and payment information is composed of:
• the hash of card details, the hash of client’s password and the hash
of order details are encrypted with the issuer bank public key ;
• the issuer bank name, the timestamp and the validity period are
encrypted with the public key of the card company.
G The card company decrypts the first part of banking information and checks
16
Figure 5: A privacy preserving online payment architecture.
the timestamp, the validity period, and the issuer bank name. The package
is encrypted with the issuer bank public key.
I The issuer bank decrypts and checks the banking information, as well as the
client’s balance.
3.6 Plateaux et al. protocol (PLVCMR)
Data security and privacy during this protocol is related to the generation of
two documents: a contract between the SP and the client, and an another bank
document, called cheque [34]. Note that the architecture cannot be seen as an
electronic cheque scheme in the classical sense of [2].
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This architecture involves an interbank system IS at the end of the protocol,
ensuring that only relevant information are revealed to the actors of the system.
It is also used to check the authentication of the two banks and thus prevents
money laundering. The service provider, the issuer and the acquirer bank have a
pair of public key/private key, where the public key is certified by the interbank
system. This architecture is composed of fourteen steps illustrated in Fig. 5 and
detailed below. The last five steps are used to provide the banks authentication
through the interbank system and thus prevent money laundering.
A The client sends purchase information and a session key KS1 to the SP,
encrypted using the public key of SP.
B The service provider create a contract including the amount of the trans-
action, a random number order, a symmetric key KS2 encrypted by the
public key of the acquirer bank, the beneficiary’s name encrypted with
KS2 , Purchase information and the URL of the SP.
C The SP signs the contract and the hash of purchase information with his/her
private key. This latter is sent to the client.
D Client’s authentication is realized by the issuer bank (not described in this
paper). The client also sends to the issuer bank the filtered contract
(without URL and purchase information), encrypted with a session key
generated between these both entities.
E The issuer bank generates a bank cheque (for the SP). It includes the amount
of the transaction, the random number order ; the encrypted beneficiary’s
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name; the symmetric key KS2 , encrypted with the acquirer public key,
information of the issuers bank.
F The issuer bank signs the cheque and encrypts it with the interbank system
public key (thus, IS will be able to check the banks identities and the
cheque validity at the end of the protocol). The cheque is sent to the
client.
G The client forwards this cheque to SP. The result being encrypted, the SP
cannot know client’s banking information.
I The SP is authenticated to the acquirer bank and provides its filtered contract,
the signed and the encrypted electronic bank cheque. This filtered contract
contains: the amount of the transaction, the beneficiary’s name, the order
number.
J In order to validate the banks identities and the cheque, the acquirer bank
authenticates to the interbank system and transfers the cheque.
K The interbank system checks the identity of the acquirer bank and decrypts
the electronic cheque with its private key. The cheque (and its signature
and consequently the identity of the client’s bank) is verified.
L After verification, the interbank system re-encrypts the cheque (with the
public key of the acquirer bank) and sends it to the bank.
M The acquirer bank is able to decrypt this cheque with its private key. The
bank verifies that the cheque amount is similar to the filtered contract
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provided by the SP. Then, the bank decrypts the symmetric key with its
private key. In a second time, the acquirer bank decrypts with this key the
beneficiary’s name and compares it with the name of the filtered contract.
Finally, the acquirer bank verifies the electronic cheque.
N The acquirer bank authorizes the SP to deliver service for its client.
3.7 3D-secure v2 (3DS v2)
The new specification of 3D-secure supports two versions for authentication:
one application-based authentication for mobile devices and one browser-based
authentication [17, 15, 16, 18]. The first authentication protocol uses a 3DS
application requestor that initiates the authentication with the use of a 3DS
SDK (integrated in the mobile device of the client). As in the previous version,
payment request and authorization are not part of these new 3D-secure specifi-
cations. This new specification also introduces biometrics as solution for client’s
authentication but it is not mandatory.
At high level, the data flow has not really been changed since the previous
version. The main modifications are the confirmation of practices which are gen-
erally already in place (dynamic authentication, risk management), some change
of names in the flows (VAReq/VARes and PAReq/PARes messages are deleted
and AReq/ARes and RReq/RRes messages are created with adapted roles), the
introduction of elliptic curves in a key agreement procedure and the inclusion
of mobile platforms in the protocol. In the following, we concentrate the dis-
cussion on application-based authentication in 3D-secure (i.e. with a mobile
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device) because, from a privacy point of view, the browser-based authentication
of 3D-secure version 2 is similar to the previous version.
In the case of a payment realized from a mobile authentication, a lot of
personal data are added in the communications. It typically includes the IMEI
number, geolocalisation data, hardware data, OS version, mobile phone number,
Wifi and Bluetooth network indicators, indication if the device is jailbroken ...
Actually, a security requirement of the SDK technical guide checks that the
device is not jailbroken [16]. These data are directly encrypted by the mobile
and are decrypted by the Directory Server (with a shared key) before a forward
to the ACS for risk management (fraud detection).
Some collected information depend to the OS of the mobile (Android, iOS,
windows phone), whereas some other collected information are common to all
devices. Nevertheless, specifications only described information that should be
collected. As specified in the beginning of section 2 of [16], the implementer shall
ensure that the 3DS SDK collects as many device-platform-specific parameters
as possible. This data collection is motivated by fraud detection. Finally, the
SDK technical guide requires that SDK binaries need to be obfuscated [16],
so it will be hard to know the precise nature of collected data. An interesting
anecdote is the absence of the term privacy during all the 227 pages of the EMV
3-D Secure Protocol and Core Functions Specification [17].
21
3.8 EMV Tokenization
Tokenization was introduced by Mastercard, Visa and American Express and is
now specified in [19]. The objective is to replace the PAN by a pseudo random
number, called token. More precisely, a tokenization process uses the PAN for
the generation of a payment token (including a token expiry date). The de-
tokenization process uses these values to recover the original PAN. These two
processes are realized by the token service provider, via the token requestor.
In most cases, the cardholder is unaware of the use of a payment token. To-
kenization has not been envisaged for user privacy, but only to reduce fraud
in card-not-present and emerging transactions. Nevertheless, in the case of a
data breach, it is clearly better for the cardholder than payment tokens are
exposed, instead of PANs. Several usecases are envisaged in the specification,
including Mobile NFC (at POS), e-commerce using a mobile or a digital wallet
and e-commerce on a merchant site (called card-on-file).
In the case of a token request initiated by the cardholder, the PAN is sent to
the merchant site. The PAN is successively transferred to the token requestor,
then to the token service provider. The token service provider generates the
payment token, realizes an identification and verification (IDV) with the issuer
bank, and returns the token to the merchant via the token requestor. This token
is stored on the merchant side (card-on-file) and the PAN is deleted. In others
usecases (NFC, mobile/digital wallet), the token is stored on the device of the
user.
During the transaction, the mercant sends the token to the acquirer bank
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and this token is transferred to the payment network. The payment network
contacts the token service provider to recover the PAN from the token. These
data are finally sent to the issuer bank for authorization. Token request requires
token assurance data for the IDV phase. These data are not specified but some
examples are given as a cryptogram, or a billing address. Moreover, in usecases
with NFC/mobile, device information as MAC address or operating system
version are expected. In addition, authentication of the cardholder can also
uses password or biometrics, depending to the required assurance level.
EMV tokenization is not compared with other protocols, in the next section,
because privacy and data security strongly depends to the usecase and to the
implementation. In the card-on-file scenario, the merchant does not store the
PAN but he has access to it during the token request phase. In the other
scenario, numerous personal data could be sent to the issuer bank, but it depends
to the implementation of the corresponding application.
4 Discussions
In this section, we analyze the different e-commerce architectures detailed in the
previous section by considering the security and privacy requirements presented
in Section 2.
4.1 Analysis of SET
Data confidentiality (S1) and integrity (S2) are respected, and the protocol
provides a mutual authentication between the SP and the client, based on cer-
23
tificates (but the client is not directly authenticated), where the SP bank is the
trusted authority (S3 and partially S5). Bank authentication is not specified
but can be realized outside of the protocol (S4). Concerning privacy require-
ments, the SP does not know the client’s banking information (P4) and the
client’s bank does not know the purchase information (P3), but knows the SP
identity. Moreover, the client does not know the identity of the SP bank (P5).
Alternately, the SP and the SP bank know the client’s identity (P1 and P2 are
not verified).
Nevertheless, the installation of a specific software by the client, as well as the
distribution of card readers and certificates by SP, makes the protocol complex,
hard for the customer. Thus, as stated in [27], all these constraints have led to
the abandonment of the SET protocol, with its relative user’s privacy respect,
for 3D-Secure.
4.2 Analysis of 3DS
Data confidentiality and data integrity are respected and authentication of dif-
ferent entities is ensured. Note that in this paper, we do not consider the
authentication solution for client authentication. Moreover, as for SET, bank
authentication is not specified but can be realized outside the protocol.
From a privacy point of view, none requirement is respected: the banking
information of the client are sent to the service provider at the beginning of
the protocol, the issuer bank knows the SP identity and the SP bank knows
the client’s identity. Moreover, the purchase information are contained in the
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PAReq message sent to ACS. For these reasons, 3D-Secure is clearly not a
privacy preserving scheme.
4.3 Analysis of the 3DS Imp
The improvement of 3D-Secure minimizes the knowledge of SP concerning the
banking information of the client (CVX2 and expiration date of the card) be-
cause these data are encrypted by the customer’s bank (R9). In addition,
whereas the PAN is known to the directory server, the client’s authentication
is handled by a single relying party, (the issuer bank). Consequently, the re-
quirement R3 is partially respected. Finally, with these improvements, the data
sensitivity is taken more into account and therefore the requirement R11 is
partially granted. Nevertheless, the issuer bank knows the client’s purchases
(R8). Moreover, in general, the client is not anonymous for the fifth actor (the
directory server) that is required to authenticate the banks.
4.4 Analysis of AN
The data encryption, the signature and the timestamp allows to guarantee the
requirements S1 and S2. Moreover, the client authenticates the card company
and the SP, thanks to their certificate (S3 and S4). The client’s authentication
is only implicit and partial because it is realized by the card company, instead of
the issuer bank (S5). For privacy requirements, identity information are not sent
by the client (P1 and P2), but the banking and purchase data confidentiality
(P3 and P4) are not totally respected, because the card company has many
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information thanks to the second package, transferred by the service provider.
4.5 Analysis of AN Imp
The modifications of Ashrafi and Ng’s protocol allow to ensure three additional
requirements fully. The client’s authentication is realized by the issuer bank with
a password (S5). Furthermore, banking information need not be stored by the
card company because it is already known by a trusted party, the client’s bank
(P4). Finally, the creation of a database containing all the details of customer’s
payments is avoided, the principle of data sensitivity can be ensured.
4.6 Analysis of PLVCMR
The confidentiality and the integrity of exchanged data during the communica-
tions of the protocol (requirement S1 and S2) is ensured by the establishment of
a secure channel between actors. The client is authenticated by the issuer bank
(requirement S5) with a strong authentication process, whereas other entities
authentication is realized through certificates, one for the SP and one for each
bank. The SP is authenticated by the client at the beginning of the protocol
(S3), with the signature of the first contract.
Moreover, the client is anonymous for the SP and the acquirer bank and
only the issuer bank knows the identity of the client and authenticates him (P1
and P2). In addition, the issuer bank knows neither contents of his/her client’s
purchases, nor the SP with which its client processes (P3). The client’s banking
information is also ignored by the SP and by the acquirer bank (requirement P4),
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because these data are encrypted. Moreover, the SP does not know the issuer
bank (P4), because, the cheque is encrypted with the IS public key. Finally,
the encrypted cheque with the IS public key prevents the customer to know the
acquirer bank (requirement P5). In addition, the acquirer bank does not know
the customer with whom the SP deals.
4.7 Analysis of 3DS v2
The second specification of 3D-secure is rather easy to analyze because the
security requirements are clearly taken into account in the specifications with
strong cryptography and authentication between all entities, whereas the privacy
requirements are voluntary abandoned for fraud detection. As explained above,
the collection of personal data have been increased, in the application-based
protocol, from the previous version. The objective of the protocol is clear,
the collection of all available personal data in the mobile phone. For example,
possibilities of fingerprinting on real-world iOS mobile devices has been analyzed
in [24] and a very accurate success rate has been obtained. In these conditions,
the term privacy requirements is not really adequate to analyze this protocol.
This specification clearly means the end of privacy in mobile payments (if it had
been envisaged one time).
4.8 Summary
Table 1 presents a summary of studied real-world and academic authentication
protocols used in e-payment architectures, considering the security and privacy
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requirements. As detailed above, many privacy requirements are not covered,
especially for protocols used in current transactions.
Contrary to 3D-Secure protocol where all actors know all exchanged data, a
privacy preserving architecture is possible, based on reciprocal knowledge of ac-
tors. Moreover, the identifier of the transaction can be used by the IS to retrieve
the client of the associated transaction in case of litigation. Another important
point concerns the deployability of studied architectures. Fraud detection is an
important issue in e-commerce. Currently, the issuer has a lot of information
and uses it for fraud prevention. A privacy preserving system may interfere
with such security techniques. Indeed, many banks use transaction information
to detect fraud. Nevertheless, does a bank should know all parameters of your
mobile device or what you bought on a website for this reason? Many recent
works showed that it is possible to process many data from the users that could
be useful for authentication or fraud detection without any privacy leakage [22].
5 Conclusion and perspectives
Personal and sensitive information are exchanged in card-not-present payment
systems on the Internet as 3D secure. This protocol is presented as extremely
secure but is not intended to provide privacy protection principles. In other side,
several others payment schemes improving user’s privacy have been recently pro-
posed. Nevertheless, characteristics of all these scheme are not exactly identical,
which leads to a difficult comparison between all these systems. A comprehen-
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sive list of requirements in terms of security and privacy protection is presented
and several systems, with some improvements, are compared with respect to
these requirements. Thus, the proposition of [34] is fully compatible with pri-
vacy principles.
Nevertheless, the new specification of 3D-secure suggests that data privacy is
not taken into account in these card not present payment architectures, because
actors involved in these systems (particularly the issuer bank) does not want
of it for fraud detection. The variety of collected data by the issuer bank has
never been so important. Until recently, it was usual (but inexact) to balance
between user’s privacy and user’s security, but in this last case, that only means
in the reduction of user’s privacy to fraud detection, not for an enhanced data
security system.
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Table 1: Summary table of the different studied e-commerce architectures con-
sidering all requirements defined in section 2 (3: verified requirement, ∼: par-
tially verified requirement, 7: not verified requirement)
Requirements SET 3DS 3DS AN AN PLVCMR 3DS
Imp. Imp. v2
S1 Data confidentiality 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S2 Data integrity 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S3 SP authentication 3 7 7 3 3 3 3
S4 Banks authentication 7 3 3 3 3 3 3
S5 Client’s authentication ∼ 3 3 ∼ 3 3 3
P1 Identity information 7 7 7 3 3 3 7
confidentiality for SP
P2 Identity information conf. 7 7 7 3 3 3 7
for acquirer bank
P3 Purchase information ∼ 7 7 ∼ ∼ 3 7
confidentiality
P4 Banking information 3 7 3 ∼ 3 3 7
confidentiality
P5 Acquirer bank ∼ 7 7 7 7 3 7
confidentiality
U1 Decentralized structure ∼ 7 ∼ ∼ 3 3 7
U2 Deployability 7 3 7 7 7 3 3
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